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Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to present a di¤erent perspective than the more traditional
approaches to study solutions for games with externalities. We provide a direct sum decomposition
for the vector space of these games and use the basic representation theory of the symmetric group
to study linear symmetric solutions. In our analysis we identify all irreducible subspaces that are
relevant to the study of linear symmetric solutions and we then use such decomposition to derive
some applications involving characterizations of classes of solutions.
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1 Introduction
Achieving cooperation and sharing the resulting benets are central issues in any form of organiza-
tion, particularly in economic environments. These issues are often di¢ cult to resolve especially in
environments with externalities, where the surplus generated by a group of agents dependes upon the
organization of agents outside the group. This problem was e¤ectively modelled in Lucas and Thrall
(1963) by the concept of games in partition function form: A partition function assigns a value to each
pair consisting of a coalition and a coalition structure which includes that coalition. The advantage
of this model is that it takes into account both internal factors (coalition itself) and external factors
(coalition structure) that may a¤ect cooperative outcomes and allows to go deeper into cooperation
problems. Thus, it is closer to real life but more complex to analyze.
There has been a surge of literature that deals with solutions for games in partition function form.
The rst paper that proposed a value concept for this type of games was Myerson (1977) and then
Bolger (1987) derived a class of linear, symmetric and e¢ cient values for games in partition function
form. More recently, Albizuri et al. (2005), Macho-Stadler (2007), Ju (2007), Pham Do and Norde
(2007) and Hu and Yang (2010) apply the axiomatic approach to characterize a value for these games.
In this work we study linear symmetric solutions for games in partition function form using the
elementary representation theory of the group of permutations of the set of players. Very roughly
speaking, representation theory is a general tool for studying abstract algebraic structures by repre-
senting their elements as linear transformations of vector spaces. It makes sense to use it, since every
permutation may be thought of as a linear map1 and it presents the information in a more clear and
concise way.
Briey, what we do is to compute a decomposition of the space of games in partition function form as
a direct sum of three orthogonal subspaces: a subspace of symmetricgames, another subspace which
Financial support from CONACYT research grant 130515 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Potosí, México. Tel. +52 (444) 8131238 Ext. 120, Fax. +52 (444) 8174705
1The precise statement will be provided in Sec. 3.
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we call VG and the common kernel of all linear symmetric solutions. Although VG does not have a
natural denition in terms of well known game theoretic considerations, it has a simple characterization
in terms of vectors in Rn all of whose entries add up to zero. According to this decomposition, any
linear symmetric solution when restricted to any such elementary piece is either zero or multiplication
by a single scalar; therefore, all linear symmetric solutions may be written as a sum of trivial maps.
With a global description of all linear and symmetric solutions, it is easy to understand the restric-
tion imposed by the e¢ ciency axiom. We then use such decomposition to provide, in a very economical
way, a characterization for the class of linear symmetric solutions and the general expression for all
linear, symmetric and e¢ cient solutions.
It is not easy to nd literature related to the approach proposed in this paper to the study of
topics in cooperative game theory. Kleinberg and Weiss (1985) used the representation theory of the
symmetric group to construct a direct sum decomposition of the null space of the Shapley value for
games in characteristic function form (TU games). In Kleinberg and Weiss (1986), the authors followed
the same line of reasoning to characterize the space of linear and symmetric values for TU games. More
recently, Hernández-Lamoneda et al. (2007) provide a complete analysis following the above scheme
to study solutions for TU games, where they advertise representation theory as a natural tool for
research in cooperative game theory. Finally, in Sánchez-Pérez (2014), it is discussed about how to
use representation techniques to the characterization of solutions for games in partition function form
for the particular cases with 3 and 4 players.
The paper proceeds as follows. We rst recall the main basic features of games in partition function
form in the next section. A decomposition for the space of games in partition function form (which
establishes the main result of this work) is introduced in section 3. We then present a couple of
applications of this decomposition by giving characterizations of linear symmetric solutions and section
5 concludes the paper. Long proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
We nish this introduction with a comment on the methods employed in the article. Although
it is true that the characterization results could be proved without any explicit mention to the basic
representation theory of the symmetric group, we feel that by doing that we would be withholding
valuable information from the reader. This algebraic tool, we believe, sheds new light on the structure
of the space of games in partition function form and their solutions. Part of the purpose of the present
paper is to share this viewpoint with the reader.
To make the paper as self contained as possible we have included an Appendix with some facts we
need regarding basic representation theory.
2 Framework and notation
In this section we give some concepts and notations related to n person games in partition function
form, as well as a brief subsection of preliminaries related to integer partitions, since it is a key subject
in subsequent developments.
2.1 Games in partition function form
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be a xed nonempty nite set, and let the members of N be interpreted as
players in some game situation. Given N , let CL be the set of all coalitions (nonempty subsets) of N ,
CL = fS j S  N;S 6= ?g. Let PT be the set of partitions of N , so
fS1; S2; :::; Smg 2 PT i¤
m[
i=1
Si = N; Sj 6= ? 8j; Sj \ Sk = ? 8j 6= k
Additionally, for Q 2 PT and i 2 N , Qi denotes the member of Q where i belongs.
Also, let EC = f(S;Q) j S 2 Q 2 PTg be the set of embedded coalitions, that is the set of coalitions
together with specications as to how the other players are aligned.
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Denition 1 A mapping
w : EC ! R
that assigns a real value, w(S;Q), to each embedded coalition (S;Q) is called a game in partition
function form. The set of games in partition function form with player set N is denoted by G, i.e.,
G = G(n) = fw j w : EC ! Rg
The value w(S;Q) represents the payo¤ of coalition S, given the coalition structure Q forms. In
this kind of games, the worth of some coalition depends not only on what the players of such coalition
can jointly obtain, but also on the way the other players are organized. We assume that, in any game
situation, the universal coalition N (embedded in fNg) will actually form, so that the players will
have w(N; fNg) to divide among themselves. But we also anticipate that the actual allocation of this
worth will depend on all the other potential worths w(S;Q), as they inuence the relative bargaining
strengths of the players.
Given w1; w2 2 G and c 2 R, we dene the sum w1 + w2 and the product cw1, in G, in the usual
form, i.e.,
(w1 + w2)(S;Q) = w1(S;Q) + w2(S;Q) and (cw1)(S;Q) = cw1(S;Q)
respectively. It is easy to verify that G is a vector space with these operations.
A solution is a function ' : G! Rn. If ' is a solution and w 2 G, then we can interpret 'i(w) as
the utility payo¤ which player i should expect from the game w.
Now, the group of permutations of N , Sn = f : N ! N j  is bijectiveg, acts on CL and on EC
in the natural way; i.e., for  2 Sn:
(S) = f(i) j i 2 Sg
(S1; fS1; S2; :::; Slg) = ((S1); f(S1); (S2); :::; (Sl)g)
And also, Sn acts on the space of payo¤ vectors, Rn:
(x1; x2; :::; xn) = (x(1); x(2); :::; x(n))
Next, we dene the usual linearity, symmetry and e¢ ciency axioms which are asked solutions to
satisfy in the cooperative game theory frame-work.
Axiom 1 (Linearity) The solution ' is linear if '(w1+w2) = '(w1)+'(w2) and '(cw1) = c'(w1),
for all w1; w2 2 G and c 2 R.
Axiom 2 (Symmetry) The solution ' is said to be symmetric if and only if '(  w) =   '(w) for
every  2 Sn and w 2 G, where the game   w is dened as
(  w)(S;Q) = w[ 1(S;Q)]
Axiom 3 (E¢ ciency) The solution ' is e¢ cient if
P
i2N
'i(w) = w(N; fNg) for all w 2 G.
2.2 Integer partitions
A partition of a nonnegative integer is a way of expressing it as the unordered sum of other positive
integers, and it is often written in tuple notation. Formally,
Denition 2  = [1; 2; :::; l] is a partition of n i¤ 1; 2; :::; l are positive integers and 1 + 2 +
   + l = n. Two partitions which only di¤er in the order of their elements are considered to be the
same partition.
The set of all partitions of n will be denoted by (n), and, if  2 (n), jj is the number of elements
of .
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For example, the partitions of n = 4 are [1; 1; 1; 1], [2; 1; 1], [2; 2], [3; 1] and [4]. Sometimes we will
abbreviate this notation by dropping the commas, so [2; 1; 1] becomes [211].
If Q 2 PT , there is a unique partition Q 2 (n), associated with Q, where the elements of Q
are exactly the cardinalities of the elements of Q. In other words, if Q = fS1; S2; :::; Smg 2 PT , then
Q = [jS1j ; jS2j ; :::; jSmj].
For a given  2 (n), we represent by  the set of numbers determined by the is and for
k 2 , we denote by mk the multiplicity of k in partition . So, if  = [4; 2; 2; 1; 1; 1], then jj = 6,
 = f1; 2; 4g and m1 = 3, m2 = 2, m4 = 1.
If [1; 2; :::; l] 2 (n), for k  1 we dene [1; 2; :::; l]  [1; 2; :::; k] = [k+1; k+2; :::; l]. For
example, [4; 3; 2; 1; 1; 1]  [3; 1; 1] = [4; 2; 1].
For every  2 (n)nf[n]g and every k 2 , let I;k be a set such that
I;k =

nfkg if mk = 1
 if mk > 1
Finally, we need to dene certain sets which are used in the sequel.
Denition 3 Let Cn and Dn be sets dened by
Cn = f(; k) j  2 (n); k 2 g
and
Dn = f(; k; j) j  2 (n)nf[n]g; k 2 ; j 2 I;kg
Example 1 If n = 4, then
C4 = f([1111]; 1); ([211]; 1); ([211]; 2); ([22]; 2); ([31]; 1); ([31]; 3); ([4]; 4)g
and
D4 = f([1111]; 1; 1); ([211]; 1; 1); ([211]; 1; 2); ([211]; 2; 1); ([22]; 2; 2); ([31]; 1; 3); ([31]; 3; 1)g
3 Decomposition of G
Precise denitions and some proofs for this section may be found in the Appendix at the end of the
article. Nevertheless, for the sake of easier reading we repeat here a few denitions, sometimes in a
less rigorous but more accessible manner.
The group Sn acts naturally on the space of games in partition function form, G, via linear trans-
formations (i.e., G is a representation of Sn). That is, each permutation  2 Sn corresponds to a
linear, invertible transformation, which we still call , of the vector space G; namely
(  w)(S;Q) = w[ 1(S;Q)]
for every  2 Sn, w 2 G and (S;Q) 2 EC.
Moreover, this assignmet preserves multiplication (i.e., is a group homomorphism) in the sense
that the linear map corresponding to the product of the two permutations 12 is the product (or
composition) of the maps corresponding to 1 and 2, in that order.
In this way2 , the vector space G may be considered as a module over the group algebra RSn. We
shall exploit this point of view in the remainder of this paper.
Similarly, the space of payo¤ vectors, Rn, is a representation for Sn:
(x1; x2; :::; xn) = (x(1); x(2); :::; x(n))
2As noted by Kleinberg and Weiss (1985), for the space of TU games.
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Denition 4 Let X1 and X2 be two representations for the group Sn. A linear map T : X1 ! X2 is
said to be Sn-equivariant if T (  x) =   T (x), for every  2 Sn and every x 2 X1.
Remark 1 Notice that, in the language of representation theory, what we are calling a linear sym-
metric solution is a linear map ' : G! Rn that is Sn-equivariant.
Denition 5 Let Y be a subspace of a vector space X.
 Y is invariant (for the action of Sn) if for every y 2 Y and every  2 Sn, we have that
  y 2 Y
 Y is irreducible if Y itself has no invariant subspaces other than f0g and Y itself.
We begin with the decomposition of Rn into irreducible representations, which is easier, and then
proceed to do the same thing for G; that is, we wish to write Rn as a direct sum of subspaces, each
invariant for all permutations in Sn and in such way that the summands cannot be further decomposed
(i.e., they are irreducible).
For this, set 1 = (1; 1; :::; 1) 2 Rn and
U = h1i and V = U? = fz 2 Rn j z  1 = 0g
The spaces U and V are usually called the trivialand standardrepresentations, respectively. No-
tice that U is a trivial subspace in the sense that every permutation acts as the identity transformation.
Every permutation xes every element of U , so, in particular, it is an invariant subspace of Rn.
Being 1-dimensional, it is automatically irreducible. Its orthogonal complement, V , consists of all
vectors such that the sum of their coordinates is zero. Clearly, if we permute the coordinates of any
such vector, its sum will still be zero. Hence V is also an invariant subspace.
Proposition 1 The decomposition of Rn, under Sn, into irreducible subspaces is:
Rn = U  V
Proof. First, it is clear that U \ V = f0g.3 We now prove that Rn = U + V :
i) If z 2 (U + V ), then z 2 Rn since (U + V ) is a subspace of Rn.
ii) For z 2 Rn, let z = 1n
Pn
i=1 zi and z can be written as z = (z; z; :::; z) + (z1   z; z2   z; :::; zn   z);
and so, z 2 (U + V ).
Finally, since U is 1-dimensional, then it is irreducible. To check that V is also irreducible, it is an
induction argument that can be found in Hernández-Lamoneda et. al. (2007).
Thus, this result tell us that Rn as a vector space with group of symmetry Sn, can be written as
an orthogonal sum of the subspaces U and V , which are invariant under permutations and which can
no longer be further decomposed.
The decomposition of G is carried out in three steps. For each  2 (n), dene the subspace of
games
G = fw 2 G j w(S;Q) = 0 if Q 6= g
Thus,
G = 
2(n)
G
Whereas, given  2 (n) and for k 2 , inside G dene the subspace
Gk = fw 2 G j w(S;Q) = 0 if jSj 6= kg
3Here, 0 = (0; 0; :::; 0) 2 Rn.
5
Then each G has a decomposition G = 
k2
Gk and so, we have the following decomposition for G:
G = 
(;k)2Cn
Gk (1)
Each subspace Gk is invariant under Sn and the decomposition is orthogonal with respect to the
invariant inner product on G given by hw1; w2i =
P
(S;Q)2EC w1(S;Q)  w2(S;Q). Here, invariance
of the inner product means that every permutation  2 Sn is not only a linear map on G, but an
orthogonal map with respect to this inner product. Formally, h  w1;   w2i = hw1; w2i for every
w1; w2 2 G.
Example 2 For the case N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, dimG(4) = 37 and according to (1) it decomposes:
G(4) = G1[1;1;1;1] G1[2;1;1] G2[2;1;1] G1[3;1] G3[3;1] G2[2;2] G4[4]
The next goal is to get a decomposition of each subspace of games Gk into irreducible subspaces
and so, we will get it for G.
The following games play an important role in describing the decomposition of the space of games.
For each (; k) 2 Cn, dene uk 2 Gk as follows
uk(S;Q) =

1 if jSj = k and Q = 
0 otherwise
Notice that Gn[n] = Ru
n
[n].
Also, for each (; k) 2 Cn and for each x 2 Rn; dene the game x(;k) 2 Gk as follows
x(;k)(S;Q) =
( P
i2S
xi if jSj = k and Q = 
0 otherwise
Denition 6 Suppose X1 and X2 are two representations for the group Sn, i.e., we have two vector
spaces X1 and X2 where Sn is acting by linear maps. We say that X1 and X2 are isomorphic if there is
a linear map between them, which is 1  1 and onto and that commutes with the respective Sn-actions.
Formally, there is an invertible linear map T : X1 ! X2 such that T ( x) =  T (x), for every  2 Sn
and every x 2 X1. We then write X1 ' X2.
For our purposes, X1 will be an irreducible subspace of G and X2 an irreducible subspace of Rn.
Isomorphic representations are essentially equal; not only are they spaces of the same dimension,
but the actions are equivalent under some linear invertible map between them.
The next Theorem provides us a decomposition of the space of games, into irreducible subspaces.
Theorem 1 For (; k) 2 Cnnf([n]; n)g,
Gk = U
k
  V k W k
where Uk =


uk
 ' U , V k = 
j2I;k
n
x
(;k)
j j xj 2 V
o
in which each
n
x
(;k)
j j xj 2 V
o
' V ; and W k
does not contain any summands isomorphic to either U nor V . The decomposition is orthogonal.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 2 Theorem 1 does not quite give us a decomposition of Gk into irreducible summands. The
subspace Uk is irreducible and V
k
 is a direct sum of irreducible subspaces. Whereas W
k
 may or may
not be irreducible (depending on  and k), but as we shall see the exact nature of this subspace plays
no role in the study of linear symmetric solutions since it lies in the kernel of any such solution.
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Set UG = 
(;k)2Cn
Uk . This is a subspace of games, whose values w(S;Q) depends only on the
cardinality of S and on the structure of Q.4 According to Theorem 1, UG is the largest subspace of G
where Sn acts trivially.
Let VG = 
(;k)2Cnnf([n];n)g
V k and WG = 
(;k)2Cnnf([n];n)g
W k , then:
G = UG  VG WG
Notice that WG will be non-zero as soon as n > 3.
The next result provides a good example of how the decomposition of G can be used to gain
information about linear symmetric solutions.
Corollary 1 If ' : G! Rn is a linear symmetric solution, then '(w) = 0 for every w 2WG.
Proof. Let ' : G = UG  VG WG ! Rn = U  V be a linear symmetric solution. Suppose Z WG
is an irreducible summand in the decomposition of WG (even while we do not know the decomposition
of WG as a sum of irreducible subspaces, it is known that such a decomposition exists). Let p1 and p2
denote orthogonal projection of Rn onto U and V , respectively. Now, ' : G ! Rn = U  V may be
written as ' = (p1 '; p2 '). Denote by  : Z ! G the inclusion, then, the restriction of ' to Z may
be expressed as 'jZ = '   = (p1  '  ; p2  '  ).
Now, p1' : Z ! U and p2' : X ! V are linear symmetric maps; since Z is not isomorphic
to either of these two spaces, thus Schurs Lemma (see Appendix for the statement) says that p1 '  
and p2 '   must be zero. Since this is true for every irreducible summand Z of WG, ' is zero on all
of WG.
Remark 3 In other words, Corollary 1 is the statement that the common kernel of all linear symmetric
solutions is W .
Remark 4 According to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, in order to study linear symmetric solutions,
one needs to look only at those games inside UG  VG. Also, from Theorem 1 we know that for every
(; k) 2 Cnnf([n]; n)g, Gk contains exactly 1 copy of U and jI;kj copies of V .
Example 3 For n = 5, we compute the number of copies of V inside of each Gk:
Gk # of copies of V
G1[11111] 1
G1[2111] 2
G2[2111] 1
G1[311] 2
G3[311] 1
G1[41] 1
Gk # of copies of V
G4[41] 1
G1[221] 1
G2[221] 2
G2[32] 1
G3[32] 1
G5[5] 0
And for n = 7, the number of copies of V inside of Gk for some values of  and k:
Gk # of copies of V
G2[211111] 1
G2[2221] 2
G1[3211] 3
G2[322] 2
G3[322] 1
G4[421] 2
4Such type of games may be thought of as its counterpart for symmetric games in TU games.
7
From the decomposition of G, given a game w 2 G we may decompose it relative to the above as
w = u+ v + r, where in turn u =
P
a;ku
k
 and v =
P
z
(;k)
;k;j . This decomposition is very well suited
to study the image of w under any linear symmetric solution. The reason being the following version
of the well known Schurs Lemma5 .
Theorem 2 (Schurs Lemma) Any linear symmetric solution
' : G = UG  VG WG ! Rn = U  V
satises
a) '(UG)  U
b) '(VG)  V
Moreover,
 for each (; k) 2 Cn, there is a constant  (; k) 2 R such that, for every u 2 Uk ,
'(u) =  (; k)  1 2 U
 for each (; k; j) 2 Dn, there is a constant  (; k; j) 2 R such that, for every z(;k);k;j 2 V k ,
'

z
(;k)
;k;j

=  (; k; j)  z;k;j 2 V
For many purposes it su¢ ces to use merely the existence of the decomposition of the game w 2 G,
without having to worry about the precise value of each component. Nevertheless it will be useful to
have it. Thus we give a formula for computing it.
Proposition 2 Let w 2 G. Then
w =
X
(;k)2Cn
a;ku
k
 +
X
(;k;j)2Dn
z
(;k)
;k;j + r (2)
where,
1. a;k is the average of the values w(S;Q) with S containing k players and Q with structure
according to :
a;k =
P
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
w(S;Q)
j(S;Q) 2 EC j jSj = k; Q = j
2. For every (; k; j) 2 Dn, z;k;j 2 V is given by:
(z;k;j)i =
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
X
T2QnfSg
jT j=j
j
n
w(S;Q) 
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
k
n
w(S;Q)
3. r may be computed as the rest, i.e.,
r = w  
X
(;k)2Cn
a;ku
k
  
X
(;k;j)2Dn
z
(;k)
;k;j
5See the Appendix for a precise statement.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Example 4 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and a game w described by
(S;Q) w(S;Q)
f1g f2g f3g 5 10 2
f1; 2g f3g 18 0
f1; 3g f2g 12 6
f2; 3g f1g 20 3
f1; 2; 3g 30
One then computes with the above formula the decomposition of such a game w as
w =
17
3
u1[111] + 3u
1
[21] +
50
3
u2[21] + 30u
3
[3] + z
([111];1)
[111];1;1 + z
([21];1)
[21];1;2 + z
([21];2)
[21];2;1
where
z[111];1;1 =

 2
3
;
13
3
; 11
3

, z[21];1;2 = (0; 3; 3) and z[21];2;1 =

 10
3
;
14
3
; 4
3

For the case n = 3, it turns out that r = 0.
4 Some basic applications
Now, we show how to get characterizations of solutions easily by using the decomposition of a game
given by (2) in conjunction with Schurs Lemma. We start by providing a characterization of all linear
symmetric solutions ' : G! Rn in the following
Proposition 3 The linear symmetric solutions ' : G! Rn are precisely those of the form
'i(w) =
X
(;k)2Cn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
 (; k)  w(S;Q) +
X
(;k;j)2Dn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
 (; k; j)  w(S;Q) (3)
for arbitrary real numbers f(; k) j (; k) 2 Cng [ f(; k; j) j (; k; j) 2 Dng.
Proof. Let ' : G! Rn be a linear symmetric solution. From Proposition 2, w 2 G decomposes as
w =
X
(;k)2Cn
a;ku
k
 +
X
(;k;j)2Dn
z
(;k)
;k;j + r
where by linearity,
'i(w) =
X
(;k)2Cn
a;k'i
 
uk

+
X
(;k;j)2Dn
'i

z
(;k)
;k;j

+ 'i (r)
Now, 'i (r) = 0 by Corollary 1 and Schurs Lemma implies
'i(w) =
X
(;k)2Cn
a;k (; k) +
X
(;k;j)2Dn
 (; k; j)  (z;k;j)i
for some constants f(; k) j (; k) 2 Cng [ f(; k; j) j (; k; j) 2 Dng.
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Set j(S;Q);kj = j(S;Q) 2 EC j jSj = k; Q = j, then
'i(w) =
X
(;k)2Cn
 (; k)
j(S;Q);kj
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
w(S;Q)
+
X
(;k;j)2Dn
 (; k; j)
26666664
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
X
T2QnfSg
jT j=j
jw(S;Q) 
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
kw(S;Q)
37777775
=
X
(;k)2Cn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
 (; k)
j(S;Q);kjw(S;Q) +
X
(;k)2Cn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=
 (; k)
j(S;Q);kjw(S;Q)
+
X
(;k;j)2Dn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
X
T2QnfSg
jT j=j
j
n
 (; k; j)w(S;Q) 
X
(;k;j)2Dn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
k
n
 (; k; j)w(S;Q)
Observe that X
(;k)2Cn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=
w(S;Q) =
X
(;k;j)2Dn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
w(S;Q)
and X
(;k;j)2Dn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
X
T2QnfSg
jT j=j
w(S;Q) =
X
(;k)2Cn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
X
j2I;k
m
 [jSj]
j w(S;Q)
Thus
'i(w) =
X
(;k)2Cn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
 (; k)
j(S;Q);kjw(S;Q) +
X
(;k;j)2Dn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
 (; k)
j(S;Q);kjw(S;Q)
+
X
(;k)2Cn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
X
j2I;k
j
n
m
 [jSj]
j  (; k; j)w(S;Q) 
X
(;k;j)2Dn
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
k
n
 (; k; j)w(S;Q)
The result follows by setting  (; k) = (;k)j(S;Q);kj +
P
j2I;k
j
nm
 [jSj]
j  (; k; j) and  (; k; j) =
(;k)
j(S;Q);kj  
k
n (; k; j).
A similar expression of linear and symmetric solutions for games in partition function form has
been obtained by Hernández-Lamoneda et al. (2009).
Corollary 2 The space of all linear and symmetric solutions on G has dimension jCnj+ jDnj.
Once we have such a global description of all linear symmetric solutions, we can understand re-
strictions imposed by other conditions or axioms, for example, the e¢ ciency axiom.
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Proposition 4 Let ' : G! Rn be a linear symmetric solution. Then ' is e¢ cient if and only if
i) 'i(u
k
) = 0, for all (; k) 2 Cnnf([n]; n)g; and
ii) 'i(u
n
[n]) =
1
n
Proof. First of all,

Un[n]
?
is exactly the subspace of games w where w(N; fNg) = 0. Of these, those
in VG trivially satisfy
P
i2N
'i(w) = 0, since (by Schurs Lemma) '(VG)  V .
Thus, e¢ ciency need only be checked in UG. Since uk is xed by every permutation in Sn, we haveX
i2N
'i(u
k
) = n'i(u
k
)
and so, ' is e¢ cient if and only if for  6= [n], n'i(uk) = uk(N; fNg) = 0 and n'i(un[n]) =
un[n](N; fNg) = 1.
Recall that UG is a subspace of games whose value on a given embedded coalition (S;Q), depends
only on the cardinality of S and on the structure of Q. The next Corollary characterizes the solutions
to these games in terms of linearity, symmetry and e¢ ciency. It turns out that among all linear
symmetric solutions, the egalitarian solution is characterized as the unique e¢ cient solution on UG.
Formally,
Corollary 3 Let ' : G! Rn be a linear, symmetric and e¢ cient solution. Then for all w 2 UG:
'i(w) =
w(N; fNg)
n
In other words, all linear symmetric and e¢ cient solutions (e.g. Myersons value) coincide with the
egalitarian solution when restricted to these type of games, UG.
Now, another immediate application is to provide a characterization of all linear, symmetric and
e¢ cient solutions.6
Theorem 3 The solution ' : G! Rn satises linearity, symmetry and e¢ ciency axioms if and only
if it is of the form
'i(w) =
w(N; fNg)
n
+
X
(;k;j)2Dn
(; k; j)
26666664
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
X
T2QnfSg
jT j=j
jw(S;Q) 
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
kw(S;Q)
37777775 (4)
for some real numbers f(; k; j) j (; k; j) 2 Dng.
Proof. Let ' : G ! R3 be a linear, symmetric and e¢ cient solution; and w 2 G. Then, applying
6An equivalent expression to (4) can be found in Hernández-Lamoneda et al. (2009).
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Proposition 2 and 4, Corollary 1 and Schurs Lemma:
'i(w) =
X
(;k)2Cn
a;k'i
 
uk

+
X
(;k;j)2Dn
'i

z
(;k)
;k;j

+ 'i (r)
= a[n];n'i

un[n]

+
X
(;k;j)2Dn
 (; k; j)  (z;k;j)i
=
w(N; fNg)
n
+
X
(;k;j)2Dn
 (; k; j)
26666664
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
X
T2QnfSg
jT j=j
j
n
w(S;Q) 
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
k
n
w(S;Q)
37777775
The result follows by setting (; k; j) = (;k;j)n .
Corollary 4 The space of all linear, symmetric and e¢ cient solutions on G has dimension jDnj.
We denote by LS(G) the vector space of all linear symmetric solutions on G and by LSE(G) the
vector space of all linear symmetric and e¢ cient solutions on G.
The following result shows that there is a relationship between those vector spaces. It states that
there are as many linear symmetric solutions in n players and linear symmetric and e¢ cient solutions
in n+ 1 players.
Proposition 5 The relation
dimLS(G(n)) = dimLSE(G(n+1))
holds for every n.
Proof. We have to prove that, for n  1
jCnj+ jDnj = jDn+1j
Dene f : Cn [ Dn ! Dn+1as follows. Given  = [1; 2; :::; p] 2 (n), denote  [ [1] :=
[1; 2; :::; p; 1] 2 (n+ 1). For (; s) 2 Cn dene
f(; s) := ( [ [1]; s; 1)
For (; s; t) 2 Dn we pick j such that j = t and let j be the smallest k such that k = t. Lete := [1; 2; :::; j 1; j + 1; j+1; :::; p] 2 (n+ 1) and dene
f(; s; t) := (e; s; t+ 1)
Then f is a bijection. Indeed,
 To show that f is bijective, take a; b 2 Cn [Dn such that f(a) = f(b) = (; x; y).
i) If y = 1. a; b 2 Cn and clearly a = b.
ii) If y > 1. a; b 2 Dn and it is easy to check that a = b.
This shows that f is injective.
 To show that f is surjective, take (; x; y) 2 Dn:
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i) If y = 1. There is at least a part equal to 1. Let  obtained from  by removing the last zero in  .
Then  2 (n), (; x) 2 Cn and f(; x) = (; x; y) .
ii) If y > 1. Let j the greatest value of the ks such that k = y. Dene  = [1; 2; :::; j 1; j  
1; j+1; :::] and so,  2 (n). We can easily check that f(; x; y   1) = (; x; y).
Therefore, f is surjective. This proves that jCnj+ jDnj = jDn+1j
Example 5 We compute some cases for the dimension of families of solutions:
n dimG(n) dimLS(G(n)) dimLSE(G(n))
2 3 3 1
3 10 7 3
4 37 14 7
5 151 26 14
6 674 45 26
5 Concluding remarks
We have noticed that the point of view we take in this article depends heavily on a decomposition of
the space of games as a direct sum of specialsubspaces and characterizations of solutions follow from
such decomposition in an very economical way. The space of games was decomposed as a direct sum
of three orthogonal subspaces: G = UG  VG WG. UG is a subspace of games whose values w(S;Q)
depends only on the cardinality of S and on the structure of Q. VG does not have a natural denition
in terms of well known game theoretic considerations, but it has a simple characterization in terms of
vectors all of whose entries add up to zero. And WG which plays only the role of the common kernel
of every linear symmetric solution.
We showed that in order to study linear symmetric solutions, one needs to look only at those
games inside UGVG and we presented a global description of all such solutions. Besides linearity and
symmetry, we studied the e¢ ciency axiom and provided the restrictions that this property imposed
in the components of the decomposition of G. Once we understood those restrictions, we obtained
characterizations of classes of solutions.
The analysis throughout the paper proceeded under the consideration of the axioms of linearity,
symmetry and e¢ ciency. The consideration of other axioms or properties (e.g. a nullity axiom)
following our approach, remains an interesting topic for further research.
Although it is true that the characterization results could be proved without any explicit mention to
the representation theory of the symmetric group, we feel that by doing that we would be withholding
valuable information from the reader. This algebraic tool, we believe, sheds new light on the structure
of the space of games in partition function form and their solutions. Part of the purpose of the present
paper is to share this viewpoint with the reader.
Appendix
A reference for basic representation theory is Fulton and Harris (1991). Nevertheless, we recall all
basic facts that we need.
The symmetric group Sn acts on G via linear transformations (i.e., G is a representation of Sn).
That is, there is a group homomorphism  : Sn ! GL(G), where GL(G) is the group of invertible
linear maps in G. This action is given by:
(  w)(S;Q) := [()(w)](S;Q) = w[ 1(S;Q)]
for every  2 Sn, w 2 G and (S;Q) 2 EC.
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Denition 7 Let H be an arbitrary group. A representation for H is a homomorphism  : H !
GL(X), where X is a vector space and GL(X) = fT : X ! X j T linear and invertibleg.
In other words, a representation of H is a map assigning to each element h 2 H a linear map
(h) : X ! X that respects multiplication:
(h1h2) = (h1)(h2)
for all h1; h2 2 H.
One usually abuses notation and talks about the representation X without explicitly mentioning
the homomorphism . Thus, when applying the linear transformation corresponding to h 2 H on the
element x 2 X, we write h  x rather than ((h))(x).
The space of payo¤ vectors, Rn, is also a Sn-representation:
(x1; x2; :::; xn) := [()](x1; x2; :::; xn) = (x(1); x(2); :::; x(n))
Denition 8 Let X1 and X2 be two representations for the group H.
 A linear map T : X1 ! X2 is said to be H-equivariant if T (h  x) = h  T (x), for every h 2 H
and every x 2 X1.
 X1 and X2 are said to be isomorphic H-representations, X1 ' X2, if there exists an H-
equivariant isomorphism between them.
Thus, two representations that are isomorphic are, as far as all problems dealing with linear algebra
with a group of symmetries, the same. They are vector spaces of the same dimension where the actions
are seen to correspond under a linear isomorphism.
Denition 9 A representation X is irreducible if it does not contain a nontrivial invariant subspace.
That is, if Y  X is also a representation for H (meaning that h  y 2 Y 8h 2 H), then Y is either
f0g or all of X.
Proposition 6 For any representation X of a nite group H, there is a decomposition
X = Xa11 Xa22     Xajj
where the Xi are distinct irreducible representations. The decomposition is unique, as are the Xi that
occur and their multiplicities ai.
This property is called complete reducibility and the extent to which the decomposition of an
arbitrary representation into a direct sum of irreducible ones is unique is one of the consequences of
the following:
Theorem 4 (Schurs Lemma) Let X1,X2 be irreducible representations of a group H. If T : X1 !
X2 is H-equivariant, then T = 0 or T is an isomorphism.
Moreover, if X1 and X2 are complex vector spaces, then T is unique up to multiplication by a scalar
 2 C.
The previous theorem is one of the reasons why it is worth carrying around the group action when
there is one. Its simplicity hides the fact that it is a very powerful tool.
There is a remarkably e¤ective technique for decomposing any given nite dimensional representa-
tion into its irreducible components. The secret is character theory.
Denition 10 Let  : H ! GL(X) be a representation. The character of X is the complex-valued
function X : H ! C, dened as:
X(h) = Tr ((h))
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The character of a representation is easy to compute. If H acts on an n-dimensional space X , we
write each element h as an n  n matrix according to its action expressed in some convenient basis,
then sum up the diagonal elements of the matrix for h to get X(h). For example, the trace of the
identity map of an n-dimensional vector space is the trace of the n n identity matrix, or n. In fact,
X(e) = dimX for any nite dimensional representation X of any group.
Notice that in particular, we have X(h) = X(ghg
 1) for g; h 2 H. So that X is constant on
the conjugacy classes of H; such a function is called a class function.
Denition 11 Let Cclass(H) = ff : H ! C j f is a class function on Hg. If 1; 2 2 Cclass(H), we
dene an Hermitian inner product on Cclass(H) by
h1; 2i =
1
jHj
X
h2H
1(h)  2(h) (5)
Multiplicities of irreducible subspaces in a representation can be calculated via
Proposition 7 If Z = Za11 Za22   Zajj , then the multiplicity Zi (irreducible representation)
in Z, is:
ai =


Z ; Zi

where h; i is the inner product given by (5).
Theorem 5 For (; k) 2 Cnnf([n]; n)g,
Gk = U
k
  V k W k
where Uk =


uk
 ' U , V k = 
j2I;k
n
x
(;k)
j j xj 2 V
o
in which each
n
x
(;k)
j j xj 2 V
o
' V ; and W k
does not contain any summands isomorphic to either U nor V . The decomposition is orthogonal.
Proof. First,
D
Gk ; U
E
and
D
Gk ; V
E
are the number of subspaces isomorphic to the trivial (U)
and standard representation (V ) within Gk, respectively.
We start by computing the number of copies of U in Gk:D
Gk ; U
E
=
1
n!
X
2Sn
Gk()U () =
1
n!
X
2Sn
Gk()
Notice that, Gk() is just the number of pairs (S;Q) 2 EC with jSj = k and Q = , that are xed
under  2 Sn.
Dene
fg(S;Q) =

1 if (S;Q) = (S;Q)
0 otherwise
Then,
Gk() =
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
fg(S;Q)
and so, D
Gk ; U
E
=
1
n!
X
2Sn
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
fg(S;Q) =
1
n!
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
X
2Sn
fg(S;Q)
where, X
2Sn
fg(S;Q) = jf 2 Sn j (Q) = Q; (S) = Sgj
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Now, Sn acts on the set Q and take Q 2 Q. The orbit of Q under Sn is
SnQ = f(Q) j  2 Sng = Q
and the isotropy subgroup of Q is
(Sn)Q = f 2 Sn j (Q) = Qg
By Lagrange theorem, we get:
jSnQj = jSnjj(Sn)Qj = jQj ) j(Sn)Qj =
n!
jQj
Notice that H = (Sn)Q acts on Q and take S 2 Q such that jSj = k. The orbit of S under H is
HS = fhS j h 2 Hg = fT 2 Q j jT j = kg
Observe that jHSj = mk and the isotropy subgroup of S is
HS = fh 2 H j h(S) = Sg = f 2 Sn j (Q) = Q; (S) = Sg
Again, by Lagrange theorem, we get
jHSj = jHjjHS j =
j(Sn)Qj
jHS j = m

k ) jHS j =
j(Sn)Qj
mk
=
n!
jQjmk
And therefore, D
Gk ; U
E
=
1
n!
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
n!
jQjmk
=
1
n!
jQjmk n!jQjmk
= 1
Now, we compute the multiplicity of V in Gk. Since Rn = U  V , then Rn = U + V )D
Gk ; Rn
E
=
D
Gk ; U
E
+
D
Gk ; V
E
)
D
Gk ; V
E
=
D
Gk ; Rn
E
  1.
Notice that G1[1;1;:::;1] ' Rn (as a representation for Sn). Let us computeD
Gk ; Rn
E
=
D
Gk ; G1[1;1;:::;1]
E
=
1
n!
X
2Sn
Gk()G1[1;1;:::;1]
()
=
1
n!
X
2Sn
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
fg(S;Q)
X
(S0;Q0)2EC
jS0j=1
Q0=Q[1;1;:::;1]
fg(S0;Q0)
=
1
n!
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
X
(S0;Q0)2EC
jS0j=1;Q0=[1;1;:::;1]
X
2Sn
fg(S;Q) fg(S0;Q0)
For x 2 S: X
2Sn
fg(S;Q) fg(S0;Q0) = f 2 Sn j (Q) = Q; (S) = S; (x) = xg
Without loss of generality, suppose jSj = k = 1 and take the case mk = m1 = 1. Here, M = HS =f 2 Sn j (Q) = Q; (S) = Sg acts on S 2 Q 2 Q and take x 2 S. The orbit of x under M is
Mx = f(x) j  2Mg = S
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and the isotropy subgroup of x is
Mx = f 2M j (x) = xg = f 2 Sn j (Q) = Q; (S) = S; (x) = xg
By Lagrange theorem,
jMxj = jM jjMxj =
jHS j
jMxj = k ) jMxj =
jHS j
k
=
n!
k jQjmk
Thus,D
Gk ; Rn
E
=
1
n!
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
"
k
n!
k jQjmk
+m22
n!
m22 jQjmk
+   +mll
n!
mll jQjmk
#
=
1
n!
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
jj n!jQjmk
=
1
n!
jQjmk

jj n!jQjmk

= jj
Finally, without loss of generality, suppose jSj = k = 1 and take the case mk > 1. Following the
same line of reasoning as above, we obtainD
Gk ; Rn
E
=
1
n!
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
"
k n!
kjQjmk
+ k(mk   1) n!k(mk 1)jQjmk+
m22
n!
m2
2jQjmk
+   +mll n!mlljQjmk
#
=
1
n!
X
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
(jj+ 1) n!jQjmk
=
1
n!
jQjmk

(jj+ 1) n!jQjmk

= jj+ 1
In summary, D
Gk ; U
E
= 1 and
D
Gk ; V
E
= jI;kj
The next task is to identify such copies of U and V inside Gk. For that end, dene the functions
L;k : Rn ! Gk by L;k(x) = x(;k). These maps are isomorphisms between Uk and U (similarly
between
n
x
(;k)
j j xj 2 V
o
and V , for each j 2 I;k) since they are linear, Sn-equivariant and 1   1.
Thus, inside of Gk, we have the images of these two subspaces: U
k
 = L;k(U) and V
k
 = L;k(V ).
Finally, the invariant inner product h; i gives an equivariant isomorphism, in particular must pre-
serve the decomposition. This implies orthogonality of the decomposition.
Proposition 8 Let w 2 G. Then
w =
X
(;k)2Cn
a;ku
k
 +
X
(;k;j)2Dn
z
(;k)
;k;j + r
where,
1. a;k is the average of the values w(S;Q) with jSj = k and Q = :
a;k =
P
(S;Q)2EC
jSj=k;Q=
w(S;Q)
j(S;Q) 2 EC j jSj = k; Q = j
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2. For every (; k; j) 2 Dn, z;k;j 2 V is given by:
(z;k;j)i =
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
X
T2QnfSg
jT j=j
j
n
w(S;Q) 
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
k
n
w(S;Q)
3. r may be computed as the rest, i.e.,
r = w  
X
(;k)2Cn
a;ku
k
  
X
(;k;j)2Dn
z
(;k)
;k;j
Proof. We start by computing the orthogonal projection of w onto UG. Notice that fukg is an
orthogonal basis for UG, and that
uk2 = mk jQj.
Thus, the projection of w onto UG is X
(;k)2Cn


w; uk


uk; u
k

uk
and so,
a;k =


w; uk


uk; u
k

 =
P
jSj=k;Q=
w(S;Q)
j(S;Q) 2 EC j jSj = k; Q = j
Now, for each (; k) 2 Cn, we dene f;k : G! Rn as
f;ki (w) =
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
w(S;Q)
where each f;k is Sn-equivariant and observe that f [n];n(w) = w(N; fNg)(1; :::; 1). Let z 2 V , then
f;k(z
(;i)
;i;j ) = 0 if  6=  or i 6= k, whereas (by Schurs Lemma) f;k(z(;k);k;j ) = z;k;j 2 V .
Let p : Rn ! V be the projection of Rn onto V given by
pi(x) = xi   1
n
nX
j=1
xj
This projection is equivariant, sends U to zero and it is the identity on V .
Next, dene L;k : G! V as L;k = p  f;k. Observe that
L;k(w) =
X
j2I;k
z;k;j
since by equivariance, f;k (UG)  U and f;k (WG) = 0. Moreover, f;k(z(;i);i;j ) = 0 if  6=  or i 6= k.
Then,
L;ki (w) = pi(f
;k(w)) =
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
w(S;Q)  1
n
X
l2N
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3l;jSj=k
Q=
w(S;Q)
=
n  k
n
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
w(S;Q)  k
n
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=
w(S;Q)
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The value of the component (z;k;j)i follows from the fact that the last expression can be written as
X
j2I;k
26666664
X
(S;Q)2EC
S3i;jSj=k
Q=
X
T2QnfSg
jT j=j
j
n
w(S;Q) 
X
(S;Q)2EC
S 63i;jSj=k
Q=;jQij=j
k
n
w(S;Q)
37777775
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